Known exploited vulnerabilities by market cap

It’s easy to criticize vendors for the number of known exploited vulnerabilities in their software, but raw counts lack context. A company with 100 software products will naturally have more vulnerabilities than one with a smaller portfolio. However, product count alone doesn’t account for a company’s size or resources.

Microsoft is a prime example: as of this writing, it accounts for 311 entries in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog—25% of all entries. This is often dismissed because of Microsoft’s size and expansive product portfolio. However, a common counterpoint is that its scale affords the company more resources for product security than most.

How do we perform a simple comparison of product security effectiveness across organizations of various sizes, making different types of products for different types of customers? We use the great equalizer: United States Dollars.

Here’s how the CISA KEV leaderboard—specifically the 10 publicly traded companies with the most KEV entries—appears when normalized by market cap:

Vendor KEVs Market Cap (USD) KEVs per Billion in Market Cap
D-Link 20 $13,310,000,000 1.503
Adobe 73 $181,670,000,000 0.402
Cisco 74 $236,300,000,000 0.313
Fortinet 15 $70,890,000,000 0.212
Atlassian 13 $64,200,000,000 0.202
Microsoft 311 $3,090,000,000,000 0.101
Oracle 38 $437,190,000,000 0.087
Google 60 $2,330,000,000,000 0.026
Apple 77 $3,510,000,000,000 0.022
Citrix 16 $1,050,000,000,000 0.015

Updated 2025-01-14

Nothing is perfect, but this approach offers a fair way to compare product security effectiveness without relying on subjective or manipulatable criteria. A known exploited vulnerability represents an objectively poor security outcome. Using market cap as the denominator avoids debates over distinctions like product lines, software versions, platforms, and more.

Cybersecurity stat of the day: The average delta (in years) between CVE assignment and addition to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerability (KEV) catalog is 2.8 years. 🤯

January 14, 2025

Script to log OverSight camera/mic events on macOS

I’m a huge fan of Objective-See, Patrick Wardle’s non-profit organization, and the arsenal of invaluable macOS secuirty tools he provides.

I use Patrick’s OverSight product to monitor camera and microphone activity. By default, OverSight uses notifications to alert you to camera or microphone activity (e.g., when an application activates these devices). In addition to these notifications, I also want to write these events to a log.

OverSight doesn’t have a built-in logging feature, but it does allow you to execute a script when an event is triggered. The Pass Arguments option conveniently passes useful inputs to your script.

OverSight preferences

oversight-logger is a simple shell script that uses the provided inputs to write sensible log entries when camera or microphone events take place. The only substantive functionality is a pair of functions that look up the process path and process username based on the PID. The resulting log entries will look like this:

2024-12-08 13:45:03 /Applications/zoom.us.app/Contents/MacOS/zoom.us username -device microphone -event on -process 99681 -activeCount 1 
2024-12-08 13:45:08 /Applications/zoom.us.app/Contents/MacOS/zoom.us username -device camera -event on -process 99681 -activeCount 2 
2024-12-08 13:45:12 NULL NULL -device microphone -event off -activeCount 1   
2024-12-08 13:45:12 NULL NULL -device camera -event off -activeCount 0

Enjoy: https://github.com/keithmccammon/oversight-logger

AI query capture and OpenAI search Permalink

I’ve been really interested in how AI engines will impact traditional content discovery models. A key hypothesis is that content creators will reduce time-to-citation by:

  • Optimizing content for AI engines
  • Seeding content into AI systems

Meanwhile, it feels as though AI engines will race to achieve “query capture,” the flywheel of user sentiment, trends, and interests that fuels first-party innovation, third-party data sales, and advertising.

Perplexity pioneered search with citations, but I suspect the release of ChatGPT search will accelerate this particular land grab:

The search model is a fine-tuned version of GPT-4o, post-trained using novel synthetic data generation techniques, including distilling outputs from OpenAI o1-preview. ChatGPT search leverages third-party search providers, as well as content provided directly by our partners, to provide the information users are looking for.

Interesting to think about how “partners” might expand beyond larger publishers, who exist primarily as a source of training data for the engine, but get the benefit of some amount of prioritized discovery and presentation to users. Maybe smaller publishers and/or individuals will begin seeding AI engines with content as a means of getting discovered?

MarTech and AdTech are the true global surveillance superpowers Permalink

Great reporting by Brian Krebs:

Not long ago, the ability to digitally track someone’s daily movements just by knowing their home address, employer, or place of worship was considered a dangerous power that should remain only within the purview of nation states. But a new lawsuit in a likely constitutional battle over a New Jersey privacy law shows that anyone can now access this capability, thanks to a proliferation of commercial services that hoover up the digital exhaust emitted by widely-used mobile apps and websites.

I’ve always held that 99.9% of us shouldn’t worry about the NSA, but 100% of us should worry about marketing (MarTech) and advertising (AdTech).

The Government™ has tremendous resources, but is also a massive bureaucracy saddled with myriad political, legal, and resource constraints. So, while the national technical means (read: spy tech) exist to hoover up and store limitless amounts of data, what they can practically do to and with that data is subject to some limits. Most notably, it’s not in the intelligence community’s interest to try to look at everyone.

Precisely the opposite is true of marketing and advertising. For every human with a dollar to their name, now or in the future, there is someone who wants to sell them something.

To borrow some intelligence jargon, the “targeting list” is effectively the whole of the developed world, and there is so much unregulated signal that two things are true:

  1. Virtually any entity within the ecosystem can truthfully say things like “we don’t share X with Y” or “we use privacy-preserving consumer identifiers”

  2. Virtually any entity within the ecosystem can piece together enough “anonymized” data to associate a name, place, and much more to any identifier, if they choose